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CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY:
PREEMPTION, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
AND STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY
JAMES L. WINOKURI
JENNIFER ROBBINSff
I. INTRODUCTION: FEDERALISM AND THE POWER TO REGULATE
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
A STATE HEALTH OFFICIAL is assigned to remedy a recur-
rent poisoning problem: children ingesting highly toxic house-
hold cleaning products. The official determines that certain of these
products are needlessly toxic; they would be equally effective with far
less dangerous concentrations of poisonous ingredients. The official
advises the state government to limit by law the permissible toxicity
of such products sold within the state. Assuming the accuracy of the
official's findings, has the state government the power to remove toxic
products from the market? May the state condition marketing within
the state on compliance with requirements as to the contents or label-
ing? Although the state's constitution and legislation may purport to
authorize such regulation, the state government's authority can be
limited by the actions or powers of the federal government even in
the areas of health and safety regulation. Such limits are the focus of
this article.
When the thirteen original colonies adopted the Federal Con-
stitution in 1789, they granted a series of enumerated powers to the
new federal government.' This list of specific powers was augmented
by three less specific provisions further defining the division of au-
thority between the federal government and the governments of the
states: the necessary and proper clause gives Congress the power to
f Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1966; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1969.
ff B.A., Smith College, 1962; J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1979. Member,
District of Columbia Bar. The research for this article was supported in part by a grant from the
Hughes Research and Development Foundation of the University of Denver College of Law.
The authors appreciate the useful comments and suggestions of Professors William Beaney and
David Engdahl, who reviewed an earlier draft of this article.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-17. In addition to the enumerated powers in article 1,
other provisions of the Constitution confer various powers upon Congress. See, e.g., id. art. III,
§ I (the power to establish inferior federal courts); id. art. IV, § 3 (the power to admit new
states and regulate territories); id. art. V (the power to propose and ratify amendments to the
Constitution). Such provisions, however, are not relevant to the present analysis.
(232)
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enact laws "necessary and proper" for carrying out the enumerated
powers of the federal government;2 the supremacy clause declares
constitutionally enacted federal laws to be "the supreme Law of the
Land," state law to the contrary notwithstanding; 3 and the tenth
amendment explicitly reserves to the states or to the people all gov-
ernmental power neither granted to the federal government nor pro-
hibited to the states by the Federal Constitution. 4
These provisions are the framework for determining the alloca-
tion of power between state and federal governments. The result is a
system with areas of overlapping authority, exercised by both federal
and state governments, and areas of exclusive authority, exercised by
either the federal government or the state governments, but not
both. Confusion regarding which are areas of permissible overlap and
which of exclusivity is not new: beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden 5 in
1824, the United States Supreme Court has been called upon to re-
solve scores of conflicts involving questions of federal and state reg-
ulatory authority. 6
In recent years, a new potential battleground for competitive sys-
tems of regulation has emerged: the area of consumer product safety
regulation. Both the federal government and some state governments
have enacted statutes purporting to authorize the regulation of con-
2. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The
necessary and proper clause provides that Congress shall have power "to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.
Id.
4. Id. amend. X. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The tenth
amendment provides as follows: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
5. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the Supreme Court held invalid a New York
statute which prohibited vessels licensed by the United States from navigating the territorial
waters of New York unless they were also licensed by the state of New York. Id. at 1-3, 221. In
the course of his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[i]n our complex
system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one general government, whose action ex-
tends over the whole, but which possesses only certain enumerated powers; and of numerous
state governments, which retain and exercise all powers not delegated to the Union, contests
respecting power must arise." Id. at 204-05.
6. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S.
451 (1962); Gulf, Colo. and S.F. By. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1894). See also cases cited note 59
infra.
1979-1980]
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surner product safety. 7 The state laws are enacted pursuant to the
states' authority to promote and protect the public health, safety, and
welfare derived from the police powers inherent in the sovereignty
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution. 8 The most sweeping federal legislation was adopted within
the past ten years. 9 Enacted pursuant to the enumerated federal
power to regulate interstate commerce,10 the federal law centralizes
regulatory authority over product safety by the creation of a single
federal agency, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC or
Commission)."
Upon creation of the CPSC, the federal government had been
expected to occupy the area of consumer product safety rapidly.
However, the disappointing inactivity of the Commission in its early
years has prompted a reassertion of state regulatory authority. Now,
7. See notes 9 & 12 infra.
8. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. For cases demonstrating the Supreme Court's
recognition of these residual powers, see, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203-05 (1824). In Huron,
the Court upheld a city pollution control law in the face of argument that a federal licensing law
had preempted the field. 362 U.S. at 444-48. In so holding, the Court stated: "[T]he Constitu-
tion when 'conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce, . . . never intended to cut
the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their
citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country.' " Id. at
443-44, quoting Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U.S. 99 (1876).
Whether the tenth amendment's reservation of power to the states has substantive effect is
unclear. The Justices of the Supreme Court split on this theoretical issue in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In Usery, the Court held that the minimum wage re-
quirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976), could not be applied
to protect state employees because to do so would "directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions ... 426 U.S. at
852. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the tenth amendment is "an
affirmative limitation on the exercise of. . . [the] power [of Congress] .... " Id. at 841-44. In a
lengthy dissent joined in by Justices White and Marshall, however, Justice Brennan stated that
"[t]he amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." Id.
at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
Although neither opinion had the clear support of a majority on this point, see id. at 856
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting), for the purposes of this arti-
cle, whether the exact constitutional explanation for the states' power is an omission from article
I or the affirmation of the tenth amendment is irrelevant; the analysis of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court in Usery is therefore adopted.
9. The principal consumer product safety law, adopted in 1972, is the Consumer Product
Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, §§ 1-34, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
2051-2081 (1976)). The oldest federal consumer product safety law enforced by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission is the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §9 1191-1204 (1976),
enacted in 1953. Pub. L. No. 88-164, §§ 1-13, 67 Stat. 111 (1953). See Jackson, The Subject was
Standards: The Federal Government and Safety in the 1940's-and 1970's, 10 AKRON L. REV.
185, 195 & n.59 (1976).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause confers upon Congress the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States . . . " Id. See text
accompanying note I supra.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (1976).
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side by side with the new federal scheme are several equally new but
disparate state laws dealing with particular consumer product safety
issues, such as hazardous substances, flammable fabrics, poison pre-
vention, and refrigerator safety. 12  But advocates of the new state
regulatory initiatives have been confronted by confusing interpreta-
tions of the limits on state authority imposed by federal powers and
actions, including those imposed by the extensive and unusually
complex preemption provisions of the Consumer Product Safety Act
(CPSA), as amended, 13 and related statutes. 14 Thus, when the Col-
orado Department of Health was considering regulation of toxic drain
cleaners, it was advised by the state's law department that federal
legislation prohibits any state labeling requirements even though the
opinion also recognized that express federal preemption of state re-
quirements was limited to those requirements which differ from exist-
ing federal agency regulations.15
The confusion regarding the limits on state authority to regulate
consumer product safety is also apparent from the CPSC's own diffi-
culty in defining those limits. For instance, when an advisory opinion
was requested in mid-1978 on the issue whether state regulations re-
quiring lighting for bicycles ridden at night had been preempted, the
12. For a table summarizing state product safety laws enacted as of 1979, see U.S. CON-
SUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N ANN. REP. 149-50 (1979). For an example of such a state statute,
see COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-5-5082(b) (1973) (authorizing executive director of state department
of health to remove from commerce products which pose a hazard "'such that labeling adequate
to protect the public health and safety cannot be devised" or which present an imminent threat
to public health and safety). For a discussion of federal statutes and regulations covering some of
the same items, see notes 36-41 & 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976). For the text of the preemption provisions of the CPSA,
see note 70 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 36-41 & 65 and accompanying text infra. The confusion about the extent of
the federal preemption of state regulation intended by Congress was reflected in the case of
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 574 F.2d
178, 181 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 322 (1978). In Kaiser, the district court had inter-
preted the legislative history of the CPSA to exclude implicitly from preemption state regulation
of products used in residential building construction and affected by local building codes. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 414 F. Supp.
1047, 1059-60 (D. Del. 1976) (on motion for preliminary injunction enjoining the application of
CPSC regulations). The district court, in its subsequent hearing on the merits, held that the
CPSC lacked jurisdiction over aluminum home wiring. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
United States Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 428 F. Supp. 177, 181-82 (D. Del. 1977). The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the inconclusive legislative history was insufficient to
overcome the plain meaning of the CPSA, rendering such a product subject to CPSC regula-
tion. 574 F.2d at 181-82.
15. Memorandum of law submitted by Michael Huotari, Colorado l)epartment of Law,
Human Resources Section, to the Director of the Colorado Department of Health (January 17,
1977) (on file with the authors and at the Villanova Law Review office). The memorandum
recommends that the health department petition the CPSC for permission to impose labeling
requirements irrespective of whether the targeted products are subject to CPSC safety stan-
dards. Id. at 2-3.
1979-19801
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Commission took several months to prepare and approve its advisory
opinion, finally issued in September, 1978, which concluded that the
federal regulations would not preempt the state requirements. 16 In
January, 1979, the Commission responded to industry dissatisfaction
with its 1978 position by issuing a new opinion which "clarifie[d] and
supplement[ed]" the earlier one. 17 This opinion conditionally reaf-
firmed that certain lighting requirements were not preempted, but
added and emphasized a new, narrower basis for that conclusion not
even hinted at in the Commission's earlier opinion.' 8
Even if the CPSC becomes more active in the coming years,
issues of federalism in this area are likely to persist. As the conflicts
16. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 270 (Sept. 12, 1978) (on file with
the authors and at the Villanova Law Review office). The opinion was issued in response to a
letter dated July 4, 1978 from Mr. A. Fred DeLong, Technical Editor of Bicycling Magazine,
asking "whether the Commission's bicycle regulation would preempt a state requirement for
lighting on bicycles ridden at night." Id. The Commission explained its opinion as follows:
The Commission believes that such a lighting requirement protects cyclists against at
least two risks of injury. One is inadequate nightime visibility of bicycles to cars. The
other is obstacles in the road that may not be visible to a cyclist at night.
Because the Commission's reflectivity requirements do not address the second risk,
we believe that a state lighting requirement for bicycles ridden at night would not be
preempted. Under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, preemption applies only if (a)
the Commission has established a requirement to protect against a risk of injury as-
sociated with a product and (b) a state's non-identical requirement is applicable to the
same product and is designed to protect against the same risk. Although reflectors and
lights address one risk of injury that is the same, the total risk addressed by lights is not
the same as that addressed by reflectors.
id.
17. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comn'n Advisory Op. No. 270A at 2 (Jan. 16, 1979) (on file
with the authors and at the Villanova Law Review office). The second opinion was issued in
response to a letter dated October 19, 1978 from the Bicycle Manufacturer's Association of
America and Schwinn Bycycle Company requesting withdrawal of the first opinion. Id. at 1.
While the Commission made clear that it was "not withdrawing that opinion," it nevertheless
asserted that "further discussion ... [was] needed." Id.
18. Id. In its second opinion the Commission began by emphasizing that its first opinion
was "based on the assumption that the state or local bycycle lighting requirement at issue would
address a different risk(s) of injury than the one the Commission has addressed." Id. at 2. The
Commission, however, added a new ground for finding no preemption in the following argu-
ment:
Our September 12 opinion should have included some additional discussion about
the preemption question that your letter raised. The requirement you described, for light-
ing on bycycles ridden at night, is clearly one which defines how a consumer must use a
bicycle. In contrast, the Commission's regulation sets requirements which a bicycle must
meet when introduced into interstate commerce. Because the Commission's regulation
does not define how a consumer may or may not use a bicycle, the Commission believes
that the Federal Hazardous Substances Act does not prohibit states or localities from
issuing or enforcing a requirement that lighting be used on bicycles ridden at night.
Please note that this advice concerning a "use" requirement is based on an assump-
tion. For the purpose of answering your question, we have assumed that the state or local
requirement would not have the effect of setting any requirement which a bicycle must
meet at the time it enters interstate commerce. In addition, since specific state bicycle
lighting "use" requirements can vary, the preemption questions raised by each one should
be evaluated on an individual basis.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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over bicycle regulation suggest, the preemptive effect of the CPSA
and related statutes 19 is unclear even in fields actively regulated by
the Commission. Moreover, although the states may have hesitated to
regulate consumer product safety in the early 1970's because the fed-
eral legislation had only recently been enacted, they now seem to be
growing restless awaiting federal "study" of hazardous products. 20
The purpose of this article is to explore the limits on state au-
thority to regulate consumer product safety imposed by 1) the new
federal consumer product safety legislation, 2' and 2) the constitutional
grant to the federal government of the power to regulate interstate
commerce. 22  The starting point for this analysis will be the federal
legislation, primarily the CPSA, which contains Congress' pro-
nouncement on the effect of federal regulation in the field. 23 As pre-
viously noted, the CPSA is commerce clause legislation. 24 In the
regulation of interstate commerce, where the federal government has
explicit constitutional authority to regulate, that power carries with it
the authority to enact statutes limiting or totally abrogating state
power in the area regulated. 25 Thus, our examination will suggest
areas of regulatory authority from which the states are clearly
excluded by the express language of the federal legislation. 26
The CPSA's preemption language, which appears comprehen-
sive, in fact contains its own explicit limitations, with the result that
many areas of potential state regulatory activity have not necessarily
19. See notes 36-41 and accompanying text infra.
20. In Connecticut, for example, amidst discussion of proposals to regulate legislatively or
ban urea-formaldehyde foam insulation, the State Attorney General reached an extensive agree-
ment with manufacturers for "voluntary" protection of consumers. Joint Press Statement by
Attorney General Carl R. Ajello re Urea-Formaldehyde Insulation (Apr. 19, 1979) (press state-
ment and the agreement on file at the Villanova Law Review office). In Colorado, the State
Attorney General has sought an injunction against several manufacturers of urea-formaldehyde
insulation under the state consumer protection statute to enjoin them from misrepresenting the
safety and effectiveness of the insulation. See First Amended Complaint, Colorado v. Rapco
Foam, Inc., Civ. No. C-83160 (D. Denver, filed Dec. 4, 1978). In light of a recent resolution
adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General, Resolution of the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys
Gen. (Dec. 1, 1978) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office), urging a moratorium on the
use of urea-formaldehyde foam insulation pending further study of its hazards, action in other
states is very possible prior to the issuance of a CPSC safety standard.
21. See notes 82-191 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 192-236 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 30-81 and accompanying text infra.
24. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
25. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209-11 (1824). The Supreme Court stated in
Gibbons that in any case where acts of state legislatures interfere with or are contrary to the
laws of Congress, "the Act of Congress ... is supreme; and the law of the State, though
enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." Id. at 211. For further
discussion of Gibbons, see note 5 supra. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
6-23 (1978).
26. See notes 82-133 and accompanying text infra.
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been preempted by the federal statute. 27  As to areas not explicitly
covered by the CPSA or other federal legislative preemption provi-
sions, we must inquire, first, whether the federal legislation preempts
state power by implication, 28 and second, whether, in the absence of
any finding of implicit congressional preemption, initiatives by state
government in the consumer product safety area would impose a
greater burden on interstate commerce than is permissible under the
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 29
II. THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. An Overview
The current federal legislative approach to consumer product
safety results primarily from the investigation and recommendations
of the National Commission on Product Safety (1967 Commission),
established by Congress in 1967 to study the "scope and adequacy of
measures now employed to protect consumers against unreasonable
risk of injuries which may be caused by hazardous household prod-
ucts." 3 0  Estimating that 20 million injuries and 30,000 fatalities
were annually attributable to unsafe products, 3' the 1967 Commission
reported that "state and local regulation of consumer products is vi-
tiated by narrow scope, diffuse jurisdiction, miniscule budgets, ab-
sence of enforcement, mild sanctions, and casual administration." 32
The report of this Commission recommended the enactment of in-
tegrated and comprehensive federal legislation designed to strengthen
and coordinate federal control of consumer product safety.33
Substantially all of the recommendations 3 4 were adopted in the
CPSA.35 The CPSA empowers the Commission to administer four
existing federal statutes: 36 the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976); note 70 infra.
28. See notes 137-91 and accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 192-236 and accompanying text infra.
30. Act of Nov. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-146 § 2(a), 81 Stat. 466.
31. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2d SESS., FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY
REFORM 197 (Subcomm. Print 1976) (hereinafter cited as 1976 OVERSIGHT REPORT).
32. NATIONAL COMM'N ON PROD. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 81 (1970), reprinted in Con-
sumer Product Safety Act: Hearings Before Subconmm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 414 (1971-1972)
(hereinafter cited as 1972 House Hearings).
33. See id. at 88, reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note 32, at 421.
34. See PROPOSED CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY ACT §§ 1-36 (1970), reprinted in NATIONAL
COMM'N ON PROD. SAFETY, supra note 32, app., reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note
32, at 450.
35. Pub. L. No. 92-573, §§ 1-34, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
2051-2081 (1976)).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2079(a)-(c) (1976).
[VOL. 25: p. 232
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(FHSA);37 the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 (PPPA); 38
the Flammable Fabrics Act (FFA); 39 and the Refrigerator Safety Act
(RSA). 40 But the most significant contribution of the CPSA was its
expansion of federal control over consumer product safety by giving
the CPSC broad authority to regulate, with few exceptions, any "con-
suner product." 41
The heart of the CPSC's regulatory authority, section 7,42 ena-
bles the Commission to promulgate consumer product safety stan-
dards in the form of either a performance requirement or a labeling
requirement. 43  The Commission may initiate rulemaking by notice
in the Federal Register inviting any "person," including a state, to
submit an existing consumer product safety standard as a proposal or
to develop new guidelines.4 4  This so-called "offeror process" is
designed to involve the resources and facilities of both private and
public agencies in developing standards; 4 5 indeed, if the Commission
accepts an offer to develop a standard or to participate in its develop-
ment, the Commission may often help pay the offeror's costs. 46  If
37. Id. §91261-1279.
38. Id. §§1471-1476.
39. id. §§ 1191-1204.
40. id. §§ 1211-1214.
41. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1976) (empowering the Commission to promulgate rules
setting requirements for performance, composition, contents, design, construction, finish, pack-
aging, or labeling of "a consumer product"); id. § 2057 (empowering the Commission, under
certain circumstances, to ban "a consumer product").
The CPSA defines "consumer products" to mean
any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer
for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in
recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a con-
sumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recre-
ation, or otherwise ....
Id. § 2052(a)(1). The statute specifically exempts several types of products covered by other
federal regulatory statutes. See, e.g., id. § 2052(a)(1)(B) (tobacco products); id. § 2052(a)(1)(D)
(pesticides); id. § 2052(a)(1)(H) (drugs). There is also a general exclusion of products "not cus-
tomarily" produced or distributed for consumer use. Id. § 2052(a)(1)(A). Nevertheless, the defi-
nition of "consumer product" has been estimated to cover 10,000 types of products. 1976 OvER-
SIGHT REPORT, supra note 31, at 207.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (1976).
43. Id. § 2056 (a)(1)(A) & (B). The section also provides that "[any requirement of such a
standard shall be reasonably necessary to prevent or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury
associated with such product." Id. § 2056(a)(1).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056(b)(1)(D) (Supp. 1979). The notice must also include the following: 1)
an identification of the product and the associated risk of injury, id. § 2056(b)(1)(A); 2) a state-
ment of "the Commission's determination that a consumer product safety standard is necessary
to eliminate or reduce the risk of injury," id. § 2056(b)(1)(B); 3) information concerning any
relevant existing standard known to the Commission, id. § 2056(b)(1)(C); and 4) the time al-
lowed for the development of a safety standard, id. § 2056(b)(1)(E).
45. See H. CONF. REP. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1972), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4596, 4639.
46. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056(d)(2) (Supp. 1979). In order to be able to contribute to the costs
of development, the Commission must first determine that 1) the contribution would result in a
8
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the Commission does not receive an acceptable proposal within the
allowed time, it is explicitly authorized to formulate its own stan-
dards. 47 Originally, the "offeror process" was the only manner of
rulemaking. 48  However, Congress amended the CPSA in 1978, 49 so
that in developing a consumer product safety standard, the Commis-
sion may bypass the offeror process altogether if it determines that "it
is more expeditious for the Commission to develop the standard than
to proceed under [the offeror process] for its development."' 50 In
addition to these means of initiating the rulemaking process, section
10 permits "[a]ny interested person" to petition the Commission for
issuance, amendment, or revocation of a safety standard. 51
Once a consumer product safety standard is in effect, manufac-
turers or private labelers of such products must furnish any dis-
tributor or retailer a certificate verifying that the product is in con-
more satisfactory standard than would be developed otherwise; and 2) the offeror is financially
responsible. Id.
47. Id. § 2056(e).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(e) (1976) (amended by Pub. L. No. 95-631, §§ 3, 4(a)-(c), 5, 92
Stat. 3742 (1978)). Both before and after the 1978 amendments, section 7(e) provided: 1) if the
Commission publishes notice but does not accept an offer, then the Commission may develop
its own standard; or 2) if the Commission does accept an offer, it may still develop a proposed
standard itself if any of the following conditions occur; a) the time permitted for development
has expired, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056(e)(2)(A) (Supp. 1979); b) "satisfactory progress" in the develop-
ment of the standard is not being made, id. § 2056(e)(2)(B); or c) the sole offer accepted is that
of a "manufacturer, distributor, or retailer" of the product to be regulated, id. § 2056(e)(2)(C).
The 1978 amendments, however, added a new provision which permits the Commission to
develop its own standard without following the procedures set out immediately above. 15
U.S.C.A. § 2056(b)(2) (Supp. 1979). For further discussion of this provision, see notes 49-50 and
accompanying text infra.
49. Act of Nov. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-631, § 3(b), 92 Stat. 3742 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 2056(b)(2)). The House Report accompanying the amendments indicated the reasons
for the changes as follows: "The [Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee] has long been
concerned about the length of time it takes the CPSC to develop safety standards under the
offeror process in Section 7 of the [CPSA]. Of equal concern to the committee has been the
quality of the standards being produced." H.R. REP. No. 1164, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978),
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9434, 9435.
50. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2056(b)(2) (Supp. 1979). The Commission must first indicate its determi-
nation to develop the standard itself in the notice published in the Federal Register to com-
mence the development proceeding. Id. § 2056(b)(1)(D)(ii)(II). The amendment also specifies
that the development of the new standard should take place only "[a]fter consultation with such
interested parties as the Commission shall deem necessary." Id. § 2056(b)(2). Finally, the
Commission's determination that it would be more expeditious to develop the standard itself
must take into account the following: 1) the nature of the risk of injury associated with the
product; 2) "the expertise of the Commission with respect to [the particular] risk of injury"; 3)
"the expertise of the Commission in developing consumer product safety standards"; and 4) "the
resources available to the Commission and the priorities established by the Commission." Id. §
2056(b)(2)(i)-(iv).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 2059(a) (1976). If the Commission does not grant the petition, the petitioner
may bring an action de novo in federal court to compel the Commission to inititate a rulemak-
ing proceeding. Id. § 2059(e)(1), (2). The court may, in the interest of justice, award reasonable
attorneys' fees and expert witnesses' fees. Id. § 2059(e)(4).
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formity with the safety standard. 52 The Commission may require
that labels include the name of product's manufacturer, the date and
place of manufacture, and certification of compliance with pertinent
safety standards. 5 3
In addition to the power to promulgate safety standards, the
Commission has been given other means of protecting the public.
The Commission may ban a "hazardous product"-i.e., a product so
dangerous that no safety standard would provide adequate protec-
tion. 54 If a consumer product can be shown to present an "imminent
and unreasonable risk of death, serious illness, or severe personal in-
jury," the Commission may bring an action 1) in rem against the
"imminently hazardous consumer product" itself; 2) in personam
against any manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of the product; or 3)
both in rem and in personam, and seek relief varying from notifica-
tion of purchasers to seizure and condemnation of the product. 55 Fi-
nally, if after a hearing the Commission determines that a product
presents a "substantial product hazard," 56 the Commission may order
the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer to take action to remedy the
hazard. s7
52. Id. § 2063(a). The certificate must be "based on a test of each product or upon a reason-
able testing program," must state the name of the issuer of the certificate, and must include the
date and place of manufacture. Id. § 2063(a)(1).
53. Id. § 2063(c).
54. Id. § 2057. In order to declare a consumer product a "banned hazardous product," the
Commission must find the following: 1) the product is being, or will be, distributed in interstate
commerce; 2) the product "presents an unreasonable risk of injury"; and 3) "no feasible con-
sumer product safety standard under this chapter would adequately protect the public from the
unreasonable risk of injury associated with such product." Id.
55. Id. § 2061. If the action is brought in personam, the court may grant "such temporary
or permanent relief as may be necessary to protect the public from such risk." Id. § 2061(b)(1).
The relief may include "a mandatory order requiring the notification of such risk to purchasers
of such product known to the defendant, public notice, the recall, the repair or the replacement
of, or refund for, such product." Id. For a discussion of notification orders, see note 57 infra.
If the action is brought in rem against the product, the product "may be proceeded against
by process of libel for ... seizure and condemnation." Id. § 2061(b)(2). The statute further
directs that the proceedings "conform as nearly as possible to proceedings in rem in admiralty."
Id.
56. Id. § 2064(a). The term "substantial product hazard" is defined to mean
(1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer product safety rule which creates
a substantial risk of injury to the public, or
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of defect, the number of defective
products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a sub-
stantial risk of injury to the public.
id.
57. Id. § 2064(c) (1976); 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(d) (1974 & Supp. 1979). If the Commission
determines that notification is necessary to "adequately protect the public," it may order the
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer to take any one or more of the following actions: 1) give
public notice of the hazard; 2) mail notice to each person who is a manufacturer, distributor, or
retailer of the product; or 3) mail notice to "every person to whom the person required to give
notice knows such product was delivered or sold." Id. § 2064(c). If the Commission determines
that further action is "in the public interest," it may order that the manufacturer, distributor, or
retailer do one or more of the following:
10
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B. The History of the Preemption Provisions
of the Federal Legislation
Of major importance to the drafters of the CPSA was the inclu-
sion of a clear, effective preemption provision which would eliminate
overlapping, inconsistent, and commercially debilitating systems of
regulation. 58 Because federal statutes have often left the extent of
federal preemption unfortunately vague, 59 the National Commission
on Product Safety recommended, 60 and Congress in 1972 adopted, a
far more detailed preemption provision for the CPSA than those typi-
cal of earlier federal legislation.6 1  Under the original preemption
provision enacted as section 26 in 1972, where a federal CPSC stan-
dard was in effect, a state regulation dealing with the same risk of
(1) . . . bring such product into conformity with the requirements of the applicable
consumer product safety rule or . . . repair the defect in such product.
(2) . . . replace such product with a like or equivalent product which complies with
the applicable consumer product safety rule or which does not contain the defect.
(3) . . . refund the purchase price of such product (less a reasonable allowance for
use, if such product has been in the possession of a consumer for one year or more . . .
id. § 2064(d).
58. Both the House and the Senate versions of the CPSA contained a preemption provision.
See H. CONF. REP. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4596, 4651. The House provision was the one adopted in the final bill. Id.,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4651.
59. For cases analyzing preemption issues where federal legislation left these matters unre-
solved, see, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (federal
airplane noise control act preempts local authority to impose curfew at local airport); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (federal standard of maturity in
avocados does not preempt state authority to impose different standards).
60. See PROPOSED CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY ACT § 32, reprinted in NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY, supra note 32, app., reprinted in 1972 House Hearings, supra note
32, at 529.
61. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 26, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976)). In the CPSA as enacted in 1972, § 26 provided, in perti-
nent part, as follows:
(a) Whenever a consumer product safety standard under this chapter is in effect and
applies to a risk of injury associated with a consumer product, no State or political sub-
division of a State shall have any authority either to establish or to continue in effect any
provision of a safety standard or regulation which prescribes any requirements as to the
performance, composition, contents, design, finish, construction, packaging, or labeling of
such product which are designed to deal with the same risk of injury associated with such
consumer product, unless such requirements are identical to the requirements of the
Federal standard.
(c) Upon application of a State or political subdivision thereof, the Commission may
by rule, after notice and opportunity for oral presentation of views, exempt from the
provisions of subsection (a) of this section (under such conditions as it may impose) a
proposed safety standard or regulation described in such application, where the proposed
standard or regulation (1) imposes a higher level of performance than the Federal stan-
dard, (2) is required by compelling local conditions, and (3) does not unduly burden
interstate commerce.
Id. The House Committee Report on the 1972 bill stated that by this provision "[lt is intended
that Federal authority--once exercised-occupy the field and broadly preempt State authority
to regulate the same product hazards." H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1972).
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injury was presumptively preempted; however, the state regulation
could be exempted from preemption if the state law "(1) impose[d] a
higher level of performance than the federal standard, (2) [was] re-
quired by compelling local conditions, and (3) [did] not unduly bur-
den interstate commerce." 62  The 1972 preemption provision gener-
ated neither state regulations nor court challenges, in part because of
the states' willingness to await action from the CPSC during its for-
mative years. 63
When Congress began to consider amendments to the CPSA in
1975, industry support for the extensive preemption provisions was
manifest. During the hearings on the proposed amendments, for
example, at least one manufacturer requested that the Commission
regulate bicycles under the CPSA, rather than the FHSA, in large
part because the FHSA at that time had no counterpart to section 26
of the CPSA. 64 Similarly, representatives of the National Retail
Merchants Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce,
and several other business and industry groups, urged Congress to
extend the application of the preemption provision of the CPSA to
the FHSA and the FFA. 65 One witness explained that "the prolifera-
tion of divergent state and local safety regulations was one of the
prime factors behind industry's general support of a federal consumer
safety program." 66  The manufacturers thus favored a preemption
provision that would protect industry from overlapping regulations.
Consumer representatives, although not objecting to the preemption
provision as a whole, argued that the "compelling local conditions"
requirement for exemption under the 1972 provision was "unneces-
sary for the protection of industry from undue regulation and ...
subject to capricious interpretation." 67  Congress responded to the
62. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 26(c), 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c) (1976)). See note 61 supra.
63. See notes 12 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
64. Proposed Amendments to Consumer Product Safety Act: Hearings on H.R. 5361 and
H.R. 6107 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1975) (statement of Jay Townley).
65. The following industry groups testified on the preemption provisions: the Bicycle Man-
ufacturers Association of America, id. at 44, 49-51, 55-57 (statement of Thomas F. Shannon); the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, id. at 149, 152, 154 (statement of Richard P.
O'Brecht); the National Association of Manufacturers, id. at 104, 107-08, 113-14 (statement of
Stanley Groner); the National Retail Merchants Association, id. at 141-49 (statement of Nancy
L. Buc); Schwinn Bicycle Co., id. at 24-44 (statement of Jay Townley); the Toy Manufacturers of
America, id. at 65-74 (statement of Aaron Locker); and Sears, Roebuck & Co., id. at 75-77,
79-81 (statement of Frank Case).
66. Id. at 143 (statement of Nancy L. Buc).
67. Proposed Amendments to Consumer Product Safety Act: Hearings on S. 644 and S. 100
Before the Subcomm. for Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
32 (1975) (letter of Peter H. Schuck to Chairman Frank Moss). For the substance of § 26 as
enacted in 1972, see notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text supra.
1979-19801
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concerns of both manufacturers and consumers in the 1976 amend-
ments, which dropped the provision requiring compelling local condi-
tions for exemption of a state standard, 68 added the CPSA's strong
preemption language to the FHSA, FFA, and PPPA, 69 and enumer-
ated in some detail the factors to be considered by the Commission in
determining whether to exempt a state regulation from federal
preemption. 70
68. See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No 92-573, § 26(c)(2), 86 Stat. 1207 (1972).
For the complete text of the 1972 provision permitting exemption, see note 61 supra. The
House Report explained the elimination of this requirement as follows: "So long as the existence
of a differing State safety standard which provides a significantly higher level of protection does
not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce, the lack of a compelling local condition
should not preclude a State from affording its citizens such higher level of protection." H. R.
REP. No. 325, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 23 (1975). For the text of § 26 as amended in 1976, see 15
U.S.C. § 2076 (1976); note 70 infra.
69. Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(a), 90 Stat. 503
(amending Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 86-613, § 17, 74 Stat. 372
(1960) (uncodified), as amended by Child Protection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-756, § 4(a), 80
Stat. 1303 (adding § 17(b)), as further amended and renumbered by Child Protection and Toy
Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-113, § 4, 83 Stat. 187 (renumbering § 17 as § 18)); Pub. L. No.
94-284, § 17(b), 90 Stat. 503 (amending the Flammable Fabrics Act, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 67
Stat. 111 (1953), as amended by Act of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-189, § 10, 81 Stat. 568
(adding § 167)); Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 17(c), 90 Stat. 503 (amending the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-601, § 8, 84 Stat. 1670).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 2076(c) (1976). Section 26 of the CPSA as amended in 1976 provides as
follows:
(a) Whenever a consumer product safety standard tinder this chapter is in effect and
applies to a risk of injury associated with a consumer product, no State or political sub-
division of a State shall have any authority either to establish or to continue in effect any
provision of a safety standard or regulation which prescribes any requirements as to the
performance, composition, contents, design, finish, construction, packaging, or labeling of
such product which are designed to deal with the same risk of injury associated with such
consumer product, unless such requirements are identical to the requirements of the
Federal standard.
(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not prevent the Federal Government or the
government of any State or political subdivision of a State from establishing or continuing
in effect a safety requirement applicable to a consumer product for its own use which
requirement is designed to protect against a risk of injury associated with the product and
which is not identical to the consumer product safety standard applicable to the product
under this chapter if the Federal, State, or political subdivision requirement provides a
higher degree of protection from such risk of injury than the standard applicable under
this chapter.
(c) Upon application of a State or political subdivision of a State, the Commission
may by rule, after notice and opportunity for oral presentation of views, exempt from the
provisions of subsection (a) of this section (under such conditions as it may impose in the
rule) any proposed safety standard or regulation which is described in such application
and which is designed to protect against a risk of injury associated with a consumer prod-
uct subject to a consumer product safety standard under this chapter if the State or
political subdivision standard or regulation-
(1) provides a significantly higher degree of protection from such risk of injury
than the consumer product safety standard under this chapter, and
(2) does not unduly burden interstate commerce.
In determining the burden, if any, of a State or political subdivision standard or
regulation on interstate commerce, the Commission shall consider and make appropriate
13
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The House Report accompanying its version of the bill explained
that by the preemption provision it was generally intended "that
Federal authority-once exercised-with respect to a risk of injury or
illness broadly preempt State authority to regulate the same risks of
injury except through requirements which are identical to the Fed-
eral requirements." 71 The Report justified the availability of exemp-
tions from preemption, even where CPSC safety standards apply, as
recognizing "the traditional role of the State in providing for the
safety of its citizens." 72 The House Conference Report, which
adopted the House version with only a "clarifying change," 73 stated
that it was intended that the
statutory findings made in determining if a requirement affects in-
terstate commerce may not be reviewed [by a court] to determine
if they are appropriate since the decision as to their appropriate-
ness is to be made by the Commission in its discretion....
... In determining whether the burden is undue, the Com-
mission must weigh the extent of the burden against the benefit to
public health and safety provided by the proposed State stan-
dard. 74
The language of section 26,75 together with its legislative his-
tory,76 suggests that the focus of Congress' attention in adopting both
the original and the amended preemption language was on cases
where the CPSC itself chose to regulate a particular product risk. The
preemption language in the statute refers by its terms solely to state
regulations addressing product risks already dealt with by an existing
federal standard under the CPSA. 77 It appears, therefore, that only
(as determined by the Commission in its discretion) findings on the technological and
economic feasibility of complying with such standard or regulation, the cost of complying
with such standard or regulation, the geographic distribution of the consumer product to
which the standard or regulation would apply, the probability of other States or political
subdivisions applying for an exemption under this subsection for a similar standard or
regulation, and the need for a national, uniform standard under this chapter for such
consumer product.
15 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
71. H.R. REP. No. 325, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975).
72. Id.
73. H. CONF. REP. No. 1022, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1017, 1030. The clarifying change was the insertion of the parenthet-
ical phrase "(as determined by the Commission in its'discretion)" into-the last sentence of
§ 26(c). Id. For the text of § 26(c), see note 70 supra.
74. H. CONF. REP. No. 1022, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1017, 1031.
75. See note 77 and accompanying text infra.
76. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
77. For the text of § 26, see note 70 supra. For example, § 26(c) speaks of exemptions for
state regulations which affect a consumer product "subject to a consumer product safety stan-
1979-1980]
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in such cases would the extensive provisions dealing with exemptions
from preemption become relevant to the question of state authority.
The statute is totally silent regarding state regulation of product risks
not yet subject to CPSC standards.
It now seems a bit ironic that Congress, in its unprecedented
effort to delineate clearly the limits of state authority in the consumer
product safety field, focused so exclusively on cases where a federal
standard was already in place. The irony results from the inaction of
the CPSC during its early years of existence. Contrary to the hopes of
many who urged the creation of the Commission, the CPSC had is-
sued only a handful of safety standards by the end of 1978.78
Indeed, there are as yet no regulations implementing section 26 of
the CPSA; interim regulations, however, have now been issued under
the virtually identical preemption provisions of the Flammable Fab-
rics Act 79 and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act.80 Meanwhile,
the Commission's inactivity has subjected it to mounting criticism. 8
As the CPSC begins to issue more safety standards, the product
risks so regulated will become subject to the detailed provisions of
section 26. However, because the Commission has enacted so few
standards, the vast majority of federal-state conflicts regarding con-
sumer product safety arising now will tend to be in areas where no
dard under this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 2076(c) (1976) (emphasis added). The implication is clear
that the federal standard is assumed to exist.
78. See CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N ANN. REP. pt. 2, app. at 129-40 (1979) (Appen-
dix L). See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1201 (1979) (architectural glazing material); id. § 1202 (match-
books); id. § 1205 (walk-behind lawn mowers); id. § 1207 (swimming pool slides); § 1501 (toys
for children under 3 years of age); id. §§ 1508-1509 (baby cribs); id. §§ 1615-1616 (children's
sleepwear); id. §§ 1630-1631 (carpets and rugs); id. § 1632 (mattresses). In addition, the Com-
mission had issued bans on four types of products. See id. § 1301 (unstable refuse bins); id. §
1302 (flammable contact adhesives); id. § 1303 (lead paint); id. §§ 1304-1305 (certain items
containing asbestos).
79. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.10 (1979). The CPSC explained the promulgation of these regula-
tions by stating that "the new preemption provision [of the FFA] has been in effect since May
11, 1976 and continued absence of procedural rules could lead to confusion and unnecessary
expenditure of resources by everyone involved." 41 Fed. Reg. 31,569, 31,570 (1976).
80. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1704.1-10 (1979). The CPSC gave the same reason for promulgating these
regulations as it gave for promulgating the regulations under the preemption provision of the
FFA. See note 79 supra. For further discussion of the interim regulations, see notes 94-114 and
accompanying text infra.
81. See, e.g., 10 NAT'L J. 359 (1978). In 1976, the House Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations reported to Congress that the CPSC "after 3 years has yet to demonstrate its
capacity to plan, to prescribe administrative rules and guidelines, and to set clear priorities. Its
issuance of a swimming pool slide standard as the first product safety standard, under The
Consumer Product Safety Act is unjustified and inexcusable." 1976 OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra
note 31, at 195.
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federal standard is in effect, and thus, will be beyond the reach of
section 26. In the absence of a federal standard, arguments that the
states are powerless to regulate in the area of consumer safety must
originate either from some preemptive implication of the federal
legislation, or from the commerce clause itself. To understand fully
the limits of state authority to regulate consumer product safety, we
will therefore first explore the preemptive effect of section 26, and
then discuss the arguments for implicit preemption and the limita-
tions on state power imposed by the commerce clause.
III. LIMITATIONS ON STATE POWER TO REGULATE
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
A. Where a Federal Standard Is In Effect
Section 26 of the CPSA makes it clear that the CPSC can choose
the extent to which it occupies any given area of consumer product
safety regulation. Once the Commission issues a safety standard, state
standards addressing the same product risk covered by the federal
standard are prohibited in all but a few circumstances. 82 State stan-
82. 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c) (1976). For the text of this provision, see note 70 supra. Although
state regulation in the form of a safety standard is subject to preemption by CPSC standards,
state bans of products regulated by the CPSC are apparently not barred; the regulations pro-
mulgated by the CPSC under the FHSA explicitly so provide. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.7(d) (1979). The
language of § 26, the CPSA preemption provision, speaks only of limits on state authority "to
establish or to continue in effect any provision of a safety standard or regulation which pre-
scribes any requirements as to .. .performance, composition, [etc.] ...." 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a)
(1976) (emphasis added). See note 70 supra. Moreover, that the preemptive effect of § 26 is not
triggered by state bans, as distinguished from standards, has been noted by the CPSC itself.
See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 266, CONS. PROD. L. (P-H) (1978).
In another opinion, the Commission gave a rather sweeping meaning to the phrase in§ 26(a), "consumer product safety standard under this chapter." See Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 269 (Sept. 12, 1978) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office). The
Commission advised that state braking or reflectivity requirements for sidewalk bicycles are
preempted by the general bicycle federal regulations if they are not identical even though the
federal regulations specifically exempt sidewalk bicycles from their requirements. Id. at 3. The
Commission's position is questionable. Since preemption under the federal legislation (here, the
FHSA) is limited by § 26(a) to state regulations "designed to deal with the same risk of injury"
addressed by a federal standard, preemption should arguably not apply where the CPSC has
merely determined that protection from a risk was unnecessary, rather than issuing a regulation
designed to protect from such risk. Further, the Commission's argument opens the door to
suggestion that CPSC inactivity can be more generally treated as a series of "decisions not to
act," potentially paralyzing the states from fulfilling their anticipated roles as consumer product
safety regulators in areas not occupied by the CPSC. In a later opinion, the Commission
seemed to narrow the potential sweep of this preemption-through-inaction theory by distin-
guishing preemption triggered by CPSC standards for architectural glazing materials from
preemption tinder the safety standards for bicycles. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n Advisory
Op. No. 275, at 2 (Jan. 30, 1979) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office). According to this
later opinion, the Commission decided to "except" certain products from the requirements of its
standards for architectural glazing materials, while in the case of sidewalk bicycles the Commis-
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dards with requirements identical to those of CPSC standards are
permitted to coexist. 83 State governments may continue to impose
standards more protective than those of the CPSC on products for
use by the state itself.84  But where a state seeks to regulate a pro-
duct risk already regulated by a CPSA standard, and the state re-
quirements are not identical to that standard already in effect, the
state's power is dependent upon the willingness of the CPSC to grant
an exemption from the broad preemptive language of section 26.85
For the Commission to exempt a state standard from preemption,
section 26(c) requires not only that the standard provide "a signifi-
cantly higher degree of protection" from the product risk than that
provided by the existing standard, but also that the standard will "not
unduly burden interstate commerce." 86 This provision concludes
with an unusually detailed listing of factors to be considered in asses-
sing the extent of the burden on interstate commerce. 87 The factors
sion "decided not to impose safety requirements for one aspect of a regulated product." Id.
(emphasis added). Thus, in the case of bicycle standards, the Commission based its opinion that
there was preemption on its finding that "there is a safety standard in effect that addresses the
risk or risks of injury presented by the product." Id. (emphasis added). This analysis, resting on
whether the Commission has regulated the same product, seems inconsistent with the emphasis
in § 26(a) on CPSC standards preempting state regulations addressing the "same risk of injury"
addressed by the federal regulation-an emphasis recognized by the Commission itself in earlier
opinions on preemption. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 270 (Sept. 12,
1978) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n Advisory
Op. No. 270A (Jan. 16, 1979) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office). For a discussion of
these opinions, see note 85 infra. See also notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (1976); note 70 supra.
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 2075(b) (1976); note 70 supra.
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c) (1976); note 70 supra. The CPSC's advisory opinions on bicycle
regulation suggest some further limitations on the preemptive effect of CPSC standards. First,
the Commission has interpreted § 26(a)'s preemption of state regulations designed to deal with
"the same risk" addressed by a CPSC standard to be limited to state standards which address
only the same risk as the CPSC standard. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n Advisory Op.
No. 270 (Sept. 12, 1978) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office); notes 16-18 and accom-
panying text supra. If a single state requirement is designed to alleviate two risks, only one of
which is addressed by the federal standard, there is no preemption. Thus, since CPSC re-
quirements for reflectivity of bicycles are designed only to alleviate risks associated with poor
visibility of bicycles to car operators, they do not preempt state requirements for lights on
bicycles ridden at night; lights increase not only the visibility of the bicycle to car operators, but
also the visibility of the road to the cyclist. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n Advisory Op.
No. 270 (Sept. 12, 1978) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office); Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 270A (Jan. 16, 1979) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office);
notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
A second limitation on the preemptive effect of CPSC standards is suggested by the fact
that the CPSC has recognized a distinction between regulations on the use of equipment on the
one hand, and new equipment regulations on the other. Thus, standards prescribing equipment
to be included on new items introduced into commerce (e.g., bicycle reflectors) do not preempt
requirements limiting the use of the items (e.g., requirements that night-time cyclists use
lights), so long as the use requirement does not "have the effect of setting any requirement
which a bicycle must meet at the time it enters interstate commerce." Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 270A (Jan. 16, 1979) (on file at the Villanova Law Review office).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c) (1976).
87. Id. For the text of § 26(c), see note 70 supra.
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listed reflect two principal concerns: 1) the feasibility of compliance
with the state standard; 88 and 2) the danger of multiple, overlapping
regulation of a particular product group. 89
The Senate Report on its version of the preemption clause
(which is very similar to the final version) underscored the balancing
of interests in the preemption scheme. 90 The clause was designed,
the Report stated, "to meet the competing interests of those who
view Federal requirements as merely minimum standarls and those
who would opt for uniform national requirements." 91
While the CPSC has not yet issued regulations or decisions to
grant or reject exemption requests under the CPSA, the Commission
has issued regulations under the amended preemption provisions of
two of the other statutes for which it has administrative responsibil-
ity.92 As discussed above, the Flammable Fabrics Act, the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act, and the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
were amended by the same bill that amended the CPSA to give all
four statutes identical preemption provisions. 93 The regulations
promulgated under the preemption provisions of both the PPPA and
88. Section 26(c) lists three factors for CPSC consideration which reflect this concern:
1) "the technological and economic feasibility of complying with such standard or regulation";
2) "the cost of complying with such standard or regulation"; and 3) "the geographic distribution
of the-consumer product to which the standard or regulation would apply." 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c)
(1976).
89. Section 26(c) lists two factors for CPSC consideration which reflect this concern: 1) "the
probability of other States or political subdivisions applying for an exemption under this subsec-
tion for a similar standard or regulation"; and 2) "the need for a national, uniform standard
under this chapter for such consumer product." Id.
90. See S. REP. No. 251, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 993, 1004-05.
91. Id. at 12, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1004.
The language of the Senate version of § 26(c)(2) differed from the House version; the Se-
nate version would have required that in order to be exempted from preemption a state stan-
dard must not place "undue burden upon the manufacture or distribution of products in in-
terstate commerce." Id. at 12-13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1004-
05 (emphasis added). The Senate Report stated as follows:
[I]t is the Committee's intention to establish a standard different from the general con-
stitutional test of the commerce clause. The "burden" referred to in these amendments is
that which falls upon the manufacturing process or the distribution system for goods mov-
ing in interstate commerce. Thus, it is intended, for example, to be distinguished from
those cases in which the courts have held that cost is not a factor in determining whether
there is a burden on commerce.
Id. at 13, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1005. Although the House
version, with its more general requirement that the state standard not "unduly burden in-
terstate commerce," was adopted on the point, § 26(c) still requires that the CPSC consider the
cost to the manufacturer in assessing the burden on interstate commerce posed by permitting
exemption. 15 U.S.C. § 207 5(c) (1976); see note 70 supra.
92. See Applications for Exemption from Preemption, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.10 (1979)
(promulgated under the FFA); Applications for Exemption from Preemption, id. §§ 1704.1-.10
(promulgated under the PPPA); notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 34-40 and adcompanying text supra.
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the FFA are identical in all material respects. One may assume,
therefore, that the regulations regarding state applications for exemp-
tion under the preemption clause of the CPSA and the FHSA will be
substantially similar to those issued under the FFA and the PPPA.
The regulations under the FFA and the PPPA on applications for
exemption from preemption assign to the states the responsibility for
determining that an exemption from preemption is necessary. 94 The
regulations also establish prerequisites for a state petition for Com-
mission consideration of the application: 1) the state standard must
have been "enacted or issued in final form by the authorized body"; 95
and 2) the petition must show that the state standard would be
preempted by the federal law. 96 Elaborating on the statute, the FFA
regulation explains the limits of preemption as follows:
If there is no Federal ... standard or regulation in effect that is
applicable to the item covered by the State or local government
requirement, or if the State or local government requirement is
designed to protect against a different risk (of injury) . .. than that
addressed by the Federal standard or regulation, the State or local
government provision would not be preempted .... 97
The regulations require that the application contain certain in-
formation "necessary for the Commission to consider its statutory
findings." 98 For example, the application must provide information
94. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1604.3(c), 1704.3(c) (1979).
95. Id. §§ 1604.4(a), 1704.4(a). The regulation further states that a standard "is considered
'enacted' or 'issued' if the only bar to the establishment or continued effectiveness of the stan-
dard or other regulation is preemption" by the FFA or PPPA. Id. §§ 1604.4(a)(1), 1704.4(a)(1).
The regulation also provides that if a state or local government is considering passage of a
standard, the state or local government may request an advisory opinion from the Commission's
general counsel. Id. §§ 1604.4(a)(2), 1704.4(a)(2). The opinion will advise "whether the con-
sumer product sought to be regulated is the subject of a Commission standard or other regula-
tion and, if so, the coverage of such standard or other regulation." Id. The regulation does not
require or even expressly permit the Commission to determine in advance whether the state or
local regulation would be preempted if issued or enacted.
96. Id. §§ 1604.4(b), 1704.4(b).
97. Id. § 1604.4(b). The language of the regulation under the PPPA is identical in all mater-
ial respects. See id. § 1704.4(b).
98. 41 Fed. Reg. 37,124, 37,125 (1976) (notice accompanying FFA preemption regulations);
41 Fed. Reg. 31,569, 31,570 (1976) (notice accompanying PPPA preemption regulations). In
words identical in all material respects to the FFA notice, the PPPA notice explained the work-
ings of the regulation as follows:
Unless the State or local government submits the fullest possible information, the Com-
mission may not be able to make the statutory findings required to grant the application
for an exemption. [The regulation] is not intended to preclude any other information
which the applicant deems necessary to state its case. The Commission may also request
any additional information needed to reach a decision on an application and may seek
additional information itself. In making a decision on an application, the Commission may
consider information in addition to the information in the application and any oral or
written comments on the application.
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"indicating whether the State or local government [standard] provides
a significantly higher degree of protection" from the risk involved. 99
If possible, this information must include the following: 1) a descrip-
tion of the hazard or risk of injury addressed by the state standard; 100
2) an explanation of the state standard and its rationale; 101 3) a com-
parison of the state and federal standards to show the differences; 102
4) an explanation of any tests required by the state standard; 103 5) a
comparison of results from any test required by the state standard
and results from any federal test similarly required; 104 and 6) data to
show the reduction of hazard or risk of injury resulting from the state
standard. 105
The state is also required to provide "[i]nformation, data, or
material indicating the effect on interstate commerce of granting the
requested exemption." 106 Based on this information, according to
the regulation, the Commission will make its finding whether the
exemption of the state regulation would unduly burden interstate
commerce. 10 7  "In determining whether the burden is undue, the
Commission must weigh the extent of the burden against the benefit
to public health and safety that would be provided by the State or
local government [standard]." 108
To facilitate this weighing, states must submit information on the
following: the technological and economic feasibility of compliance
with the proposed state standard;109 the cost of compliance; 110 the
geographic distribution of the products to which the state standard
would apply; " the probability that other states will apply for an
exemption for a similar standard or requirement; 112 and any cir-
99. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1604.7(c), 1704.7(e) (1979). Information required by other provisions in-
cludes the following: 1) a copy of the state or local standard with, if possible, its legislative
history, id §§ 1604.7(a), 1704.7(a); 2) "an explanation of why compliance with the State or local
government standard would cause .. .[the product] to be in violation" of the federal standard,
id. §§ 1604.7(b), 1704.7(d); and 3) "a list of interested parties including consumer groups poten-
tially affected," id. §§ 1604.7(e), 170 4.7(g).
100. Id. §§ 1604.7(c)(1), 1704.7(e)(1).
101. id. § 1604.7(c)(2), 1704.7(e)(2).
102. Id. §§ 1604.7(c)(3), 1704.7(e)(4).
103. Id. §§ 1604.7(c)(4), 1704.7(e)(3).
104. Id. § 1604.7(c)(5), 1704.7(e)(4).105. Id. §§1604.7(c)(6), 1704.7(e)(6).
106. Id. § 1604.7(d), 1704.7(0.
107. Id.
108. id.
109. Id. §§ 1604.7(d)(1), 1704.7(f)(1).
110. Id. § 1604.7(d)(2), (3), 1704.7(f)(2), (3).
111. Id. § 1604.7(d)(4), 1704.7(f)(4).112. Id. §§1604.7(d)(5), 1704.7(f)(5).
1979-1980]
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cumstances weighing against the need for a national, uniform stan-
dard. 113
The regulations regarding exemptions from preemption closely
follow the statutory language and the legislative history of these pro-
visions. 114 States requesting an exemption must present extensive
information in substantial technical detail. 115  It is clearly not a task
to be undertaken lightly.
The first and, as yet, the only request for an exemption came
from the State of California. 116 The state sought an exemption from
the federal flammability standards for children's clothing promulgated
under the FFA (covering only sleepwear), to permit the state to en-
force its regulations requiring the labeling of flammable fabrics and
the extension of the federal flammability standards to cover all chil-
dren's clothing. 117 The case is useful to consider here both because
the findings of fact and reasons for denial illuminate the Commission's
approach to "balancing" burdens and benefits, and because the deci-
sion to deny California's request suggests the strength of the pre-
sumption in favor of preemption and against exemption built into the
legislation.
After receiving the California request, the Commission proposed
a regulation permitting the exemption, 1 18 took testimony in oral and
written form, 119 and then denied the California exemption request.12
0
The Commission rested this denial on the basis that "the California
regulations would unduly burden interstate commerce." 121 The
question whether the California standard would have provided a
higher degree of protection 122 was not addressed by the Commission
113. Id. §§ 1604.7(d)(6), 1704.7(f)(6).
114. For a discussion of the preemption provisions and their legislative history, see notes
58-74 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 98-113 and accompanying text supra.
116. Proposed Exemption from Preemption, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,294, 56,294 (1976). The Com-
mission found that the request filed by the state complied with the regulations establishing the
requirements for proposal of the exemption. Id. For the requirements for proposal of an exemp-
tion, see notes 95-113 and accompanying text supra.
117. 41 Fed. Reg. at 56,294-95. The federal standards for children's clothing are codified in
16 C.F.R. §§ 1610, 1615-1616 (1979).
118. 41 Fed. Reg. at 56,295.
119. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,402, 39,403 (1976). The Commission took oral testimony at hearings
held in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Id.
120. Id. at 39,408.
121. Id. For a discussion of the factors which led the Commission to so conclude, see notes
124-29 & 132-33 and accompanying text infra.
122. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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in its findings; the finding of an "undue burden" made this determi-
nation "unnecessary." 123
The Commission's detailed findings of fact on all aspects of the
burdensome impact on interstate commerce indicated the following
effects: 1) the proposed standard would be inconvenient and costly to
manufacturers and distributors of children's clothing; 124 2) the stan-
dard was in part technologically infeasible; 125 3) the standard would
substantially increase costs to the consumer;126 and 4) the standard
would disrupt existing geographic distribution patterns for fabrics
manufactured into children's clothing. 127 The Commission also re-
ceived information indicating that a number of other states would
adopt similar flammability standards for children's clothing and would
apply for exemptions if the California application were granted.' 28
This highly detailed information, discussed at length by the Com-
mission, described only the burden side of the balance. 129
On the benefit side, the Commission received information re-
garding "burn scenarios," incidence and prevalence of burns to chil-
123. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,402, 39,408 (1976). In its notice proposing the regulation exempting the
California standards, the Commission had also sought information and data on these questions.
41 Fed. Reg. 56,296 (1975).
124. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,402, 39,404, 39,406-07 (1976). The Commission analyzed the California
labeling and flammability requirements separately. Id. at 39,404. The Commission received
lengthy statistical and economic testimony of the increased cost in the manufacture of children's
clothing to be caused by the California labeling and flammability standards, and found that it
indicated a burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 39,404, 39,406-07.
125. Id. at 39,405-06. The Commisssion received no testimony indicating that it was not
technologically feasible to comply with the labeling requirements, and therefore could not find
that any burden on interstate commerce existed due to a lack of adequate technology. id. at
39,404. The Commission did receive lengthy testimony on the technological difficulties posed
by requiring compliance with the California manufacturing-related regulations. Id. at 39,405-06.
The information elaborated on the state of the art in treating fabrics and threads with flame
retardants. Id.
126. Id. at 39,404, 39,406. The information received regarding the cost to the consumer
caused by exemption of the California standards included, for example, studies showing an
increase in retail cost of 25% in a $4.00 garment if the labeling requirement were imposed, id.
at 39,404, and cost increases of between 25 and 65 percent if the flammability standards were
imposed. Id. at 39,406.
127. Id. at 39,404, 39,407.
128. Id. at 39,407. Nine states were mentioned in this regard: Arkansas, Colorado, New
Hampshire, New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. Since
the Commission received no comments indicating that any other state would also apply for an
exemption from labeling requirements, it was unable to find that the possibility of other states
applying created a burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 39,404.
129. Id. at 39,404, 39,407. The Commission also received comments indicating that there was
a need for a national, uniform flammability standard, and that there were no special cir-
cumstances making it necessary for California to have its own flammability regulations. Id. at
39,407. Thus, the Commission concluded that the California flammability standards would im-
pose a burden on interstate commerce. Id. Since no comments were received regarding the
need or lack of need for a national uniform labeling standard, the Commission was "unable to
make a factual determination . . . concerning the need for a national, uniform . . . standard
requiring . . . labeling." Id. at 39,404.
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dren, and the severity of the injuries resulting from such burns.' 30
The Commission's ruling, however, does not evaluate this informa-
tion. Judging by the scant amount of space in the opinion devoted to
information received oi the benefit side, it may be that there simply
was not enough information on benefits presented to the Commis-
sion. 131
Among the particular facts that led to the determination that the
California exemption's burden on interstate commerce was undue
were the following: 1) some fabrics would no longer be sold in
California because they would be unable to comply with the standard;
2) the State Fire Marshall himself conceded that the "vast majority"
of consumers "would not consider the few available flame retardant
fabrics to be satisfactory for most articles of children's clothing"; 3)
technological impediments to compliance existed; and 4) compliance
would impose a high cost to consumers (an additional annual cost to
California consumers of $150-250 million). 13 2  Noting that even the
testimony of the State Fire Marshall conceded facts indicating a great
burden on interstate commerce, the Commission concluded that
neither the State of California nor any other party had "shown that
the burden of the California regulations on interstate commerce [was]
outweighed by any benefit to public health and safety that may be
provided by the California regulations."'33
The denial of the California request illustrates that where a fed-
eral safety standard is in effect, so that the explicit preemption provi-
sion of either section 26 or one of its counterparts is called into play,
the state bears a heavy burden to overcome the statute's preemptive
force. Would the California regulation have withstood a court chal-
lenge if there had been no federal regulation of flammability in chil-
dren's clothing? Or is there a possibility that a state regulation of
consumer product safety could be implicitly prempted? The next sec-
tion addresses the notion of implicit preemption to determine what
limits it may place on state regulation.
130. Id. at 39,407-08.
131. The portion of the Commission's opinion describing the burden of the exemption con-
sumed over ten times the column space devoted to its discussion of the benefits. See id. at
39,404-08.
132. Id. at 39,408.
133. Id.
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B. Where No Federal Standard Is In Effect
1. Implicit Preemption
If federal legislation is to be "the supreme Law of the Land" as
the supremacy clause requires, 134 then where federal legislation pro-
hibits or limits state regulation, inconsistent state activity must yield
to the congressional mandate. 135 As the immediately preceding dis-
cussion of section 26 of the CPSA suggests, 136 where Congress
explicitly preempts state activity, analysis of the preemptive effect of
federal legislation should require only traditional statutory interpreta-
tion of the "plain meaning" of the statutory language in light of the
policies behind the congressional action.
But preemption of state law need not be explicit. To be sure, as
Mr. Justice Douglas stated thirty-one years ago in Rice v. Sante Fe
Elevator Corp.,137 the "historic police powers of the States [are] not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." 138 However, such a "clear and man-
ifest purpose" to preempt may not appear in the statutory language.
When the legislation by itself fails to resolve all questions of preemp-
tion, then the answers must be inferred from the congressional pur-
pose behind the statute. 139 The court will draw the inferences from
several sources, as the Rice opinion explains:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it. . . . Or the Act of Congress may touch on a field
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject. . . . Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it may
reveal the same purpose. . . . Or the state policy may produce a
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.140
The Rice decision is a good illustration of the Court's approach to
preemption. In Rice, the Supreme Court faced a question of the
preemptive effect of amendments to the United States Warehouse
134. For the text of the supremacy clause, see note 3 supra.
135. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-06 (1819). For a discussion of Gibbons, see note 5 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 82-91 supra.
137. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
138. Id. at 230 (citations omitted).
139. id.
140. Id. (citations omitted).
1979-1980]
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Act (Act). 141 Although the Act, as originally enacted, made federal
regulation in the area subservient to state law, 142 the statute was
changed in 1931 to provide that "the power, jurisdiction and author-
ity conferred . . . under this Act shall be exclusive." 143 When pro-
ceedings were commenced against Illinois warehousemen under Il-
linois statutes in 1944, they sought injunctive relief on the ground
that the 1931 amendments to the Federal Act preempted the state
regulation.144 Rice thus presented a controversy where Congress had
explicitly addressed the preemption issue in its legislation. Nonethe-
less, the Court did not find that the statutory language, standing
alone, resolved the preemption issue. Instead, the Court presented a
lengthy analysis of the legislative history of the amendments to the
Federal Act emphasizing, for example, a statement in a House Report
that the exclusivity provision was designed to make the Act "inde-
pendent of any State legislation on the subject." 145 Based on such
history, the Court announced that the test for determining whether
state warehouse regulation has been preempted by the Act is
"whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is [in]
any way regulated by the Federal Act." 146 Applying this test to the
twelve alleged violations of state law at issue, the Court held that the
Illinois statutes governing nine of the charges had been preemp-
ted, 147 but found no preemption of the state law applicable to the
remaining three allegations. 148
In addition to enunciating the test for preemption by inference
quoted above, 149 Rice teaches that even where a federal statute con-
tains language addressing the preemption issue, the limits of the stat-
141. Id. at 222. See United States Warehouse Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-273 (1976). The Act pro-
vides, inter alia, for the licensing, inspecting, and maintenance of warehouses, and prohibits
discrimination in choosing customers. See, e.g., id. §§ 243, 244, 254 & 260.
142. See United States Warehouse Act, ch. 313, pt. C, § 29, 39 Stat. 490 (1916) (current
version at 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1976)). The Act at that time provided, in pertinent part, that "nothing
in this Act shall be construed to conflict with, or to authorize any conflict with, or in any way to
impair or limit the effect or operation of the laws of any State relating to warehouses. ... Id.
The quoted portion of the Act was eliminated by the amendment at issue in Rice. See Act of
Mar. 2, 1931, ch. 366, § 9, 46 Stat. 1463 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1976)).
143. Act of Mar. 2, 1931, ch. 366, § 9, 46 Stat. 1463 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1976)).
144. 331 U.S. at 220-22.
145. Id. at 234, quoting H.R. REP. No. 2314, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1931). See also 331
U.S. at 223-24, 223 n.4, 233-34 (quoting other pertinent portions of the legislative history of the
United States Warehouse Act).
146. 331 U.S. at 236.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 237. The Court stated that because the Act "contains no language relating ex-
pressly to these three matters," state law should not be preempted. Id. The Court acknowl-
edged that future conflicts might arise in the areas left to state regulation by the decision, but
declared that "[a]ny such objections are at this stage premature." Id.
149. See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
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ute's preemptive effect may be determined by examining the whole
statute together with its legislative history.' 50 In other words, argu-
ments for both explicit and implicit preemption may be applicable.
The emphasis in Rice on eliciting and achieving the purposes of the
federal legislation reaffirms the notion that, within the realm of its
constitutional authority, Congress is free to control the extent of fed-
eral preemption of state legislation.' 5 ' And yet, even though
preemption issues are frequently phrased by the Supreme Court as
questions of congressional intent, 152 those questions may turn on fac-
tors lying outside the specific concerns actually in the minds of the
Congresspersons who voted to enact particular legislation.' 53 Thus,
the critical issue to be resolved is not restricted to whether Congress
consciously intended preemption; rather, it must also be determined
whether the overall objectives of Congress in enacting the legislation
would be thwarted by the challenged state action.' 54
This principle, that issues of implicit preemption are to be re-
solved by examining the probable effect of the challenged state law on
Congress' legislative objectives, is also well illustrated by the Court's
more recent decision in Jones v. Rath Packing C0.155 In Rath Pack-
ing, the Court invalidated California labeling requirements for bacon
and flour on the ground that they were preempted by two federal
150. See notes 144-48 and accompanying text supra.
151. 331 U.S. at 229-30. "It is clear that since warehouses engaged in the storage of grain for
interstate or foreign commerce are in the federal domain, . . . Congress may, if it chooses, take
unto itself all regulatory authority over them . . . , share the task with the States, or adopt as
federal policy the state scheme of regulation." Id. (citations omitted).
152. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-46 (1960);
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10 (1957); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497,
504 (1956); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 84 (1939). Consider the general
statement of principles applicable to preemption issues set forth in Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963), where the Court stated that "[t]he test of
whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way,
is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of
the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives." Id.
153. See generally Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construc-
tion, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 209-10 (1959). The Stanford author stated as follows:
By framing the pre-emption question in terms of specific congressional intent the
Supreme Court has manufactured difficulties for itself. Apart from the difficult problem of
defining which Congress' and which congressman's intent is relevant, this manner of stat-
ing the issue suggests that the pre-emption question was consciously resolved and that
only diligent effort is needed to reveal the intended solution. But Congress, embroiled in
controversy over policy issues, rarely anticipates the possible ramifications of its acts upon
state law.
Id. at 209 (footnotes omitted).
154. The classic formulation of this issue is whether the state action "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
155. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
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statutes. 156 In both situations, the applicable federal regulations al-
lowed greater variation between the actual weight of products offered
for sale and the weight stated on the package label than the California
regulations permitted. 157 With respect to bacon labeling, the stricter
California standard was held to be explicitly preempted by language
in the Federal Meat Inspection Act 158 which prohibits "[m]arking,
labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to or dif-
ferent than, those made" pursuant to the federal statute. 159 The
state labeling requirements applicable to flour packages presented a
more difficult problem, however, since the applicable federal statute,
the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA), 160 contained preemp-
tive language not nearly so strong as that in the Federal Meat Inspec-
tion Act. ' 6 '
Concluding that the FPLA did not explicitly preempt the
California statute, 162 the Court examined the effect of the California
statute to determine whether it had been implicitly preempted.' 63
While the California standard required that the label accurately re-
flect the weight of the product at the time of sale, the federal stan-
dard merely required that the label accurately reflect the weight at
the time of packing and allowed for subsequent changes in weight
due to moisture loss. 164  Thus, the Court reasoned, non-California
flour packers would have to overpack to ensure conformity with the
California standards, while California packers-able to adjust for local
climate conditions-and non-California producers not marketing in
California would be able to pack less flour in a package of nominally
the same weight.165  The Court concluded that this result would frus-
trate a central policy of the federal statute: "to facilitate value com-
156. Id. at 530-32, 540-43. The California statute prescribing the challenged labeling re-
quirements, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 12211 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979), was held by the
Court to be explicitly preempted regarding bacon packages by the Federal Meat Inspection Act,
21 U.S.C. § 678 (1976), and implicitly preempted regarding flour packages by the Fair Packag-
ing and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1976). 430 U.S. at 530-32, 540-43.
157. 430 U.S. at 531-32, 541-42. For a discussion of the differences between the federal and
state standards, see text accompanying note 164 infra.
158. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1976).
159. 430 U.S. at 530, quoting 21 U.S.C. § 678 (1976).
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1976).
161. The preemption provision of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act superseded state re-
quirements only "insofar as they ... provide for the labeling of the net quantity of contents of
the package . . . which [is] less stringent than or reqUire[s] information different from" federal
standards. 15 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
162. 430 U.S. at 538-40.
163. Id. at 540-41.
164. Id. at 531-32, 541-42.
165. Id. at 541-43.
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parisons among similar products." 166 Therefore, the Court held that
the California labeling regulations were implicitly preempted. 167
Since federal legislation can implicitly preempt state activity
which frustrates the objectives of the federal law,' 68 and can do so
even where express statutory language addresses the question of
preemption,' 69 we must reexamine the legislative scheme and objec-
tives of the Consumer Product Safety Act to determine whether its
preemptive effect extends beyond the limited situations specifically
addressed by section 26 (i.e., where there is no federal safety stan-
dard in effect). 170
It is likely that any argument that state regulation of consumer
product safety is implicitly preempted by the CPSA would stress the
concern, reflected in the statute's legislative history, that manufactur-
ers should only be subjected to a single, uniform pattern of regulation
administered by the federal government. 171 Indeed, one reason for
enactment of the CPSA in the first place was the criticism of the
jurisdictional confusion and casual administration of state regulatory
efforts contained in the report of the National Commission on Product
Safety.' 72  Proponents of this argument might characterize creation of
the CPSC as a congressional decision to federalize and centralize prod-
uct safety regulation, or to "occupy the field" that had been poorly
handled by the states.
To bolster such an argument, it would be tempting to draw on
the apparent parallels between a controversy in this field and the
conflict resolved by the Supreme Court in Guss v. Utah Labor Rela-
tions Board.173 Guss determined that the National Labor Relations
166. Id. at 541, 543.
167. Id. The Supreme Court has, on occasion, recognized that preemption need not be lim-
ited to cases where there is a clear "conflict" between federal law and state law in the sense
that the federal and state statutes would require the same individuals or entities to act in
contrary ways. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1961); Franklin Nat'l Bank
v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954); Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). Indeed,
one commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court's preemption decisions can be clas-
sified as "conflict" cases, "interference" cases, and cases where federal law has "occupied the
field." Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515, 526-33.
168. See notes 137-67 and accompanying text supra.
169. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); notes 156-67 and accompanying text
supra.
170. See notes 82-91 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying note 77 supra.
171. For examples of the arguments advanced by industry representatives during congres-
sional consideration of the 1976 amendments to § 26 of the CPSA, see notes 64-67 and accom-
panying text supra.
172. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
173. 353 U.S. 1 (1957). In Guss, a union had been certified by the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) as the bargaining representative of a small manufacturer's employees at a time
when the NLRB chose to exercise jurisdiction over businesses of such small size. Id. at 3-5.
1979-1980]
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Act (NLRA) 174 preempted state regulation of labor relations in areas
where the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had declined to
exercise its authority for internal administrative reasons. 175  Section
10(a) of the NLRA 176 allows the NLRB to cede agency jurisdiction
over unfair labor pactices to state agencies under certain cir-
cumstances. 177 From the presence of this clause, and the absence of
any other legislative provision for state activity, the Court discerned a
congressional intention to limit state activity in the field to areas
where jurisdiction was ceded pursuant to section 10(a). 178
The analogy between the Guss case and the issue of preemption
under the CPSA is based on the presence in both situations of the
following factors: 1) an articulated congressional concern for uniform
regulation in the field; 179 2) the presence of an accommodation provi-
sion in the applicable federal statute allowing limited state activity,
with permission of the federal agency; 180 and 3) the disinclination of
the federal agency, for reasons administrative rather than substantive,
to become involved in an area within its- statutory authority. 18'
After the union had filed charges with the NLRB that the manufacturer had engaged in unfair
labor practices, the NLRB revised its guidelines for exercising jurisdiction to exclude manufac-
turers of the size of the manufacturer in Guss. Id. at 3-4. The NLRB, therefore, declined to
exercise jurisdiction, and the union filed substantially the same charges with the state labor
relations board pursuant to the state labor relations act. Id. at 5. The manufacturer appealed
from the state supreme court's affirmance of the state board's remedial order finding that the
state board had jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at 5-6.
174. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
175. 353 U.S. at 9-10.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
177. Id. See 353 U.S. at 6-9. Section 10(a) provides:
(a) The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting com-
merce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the
Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to
such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufactur-
ing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character)
even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provi-
sion of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by
such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this subchapter or has
received a construction inconsistent therewith.
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
178. 353 U.S. 7-10. The Court stated that § 10(a) was "the exclusive means whereby states
may be enabled to act concerning the matters which Congress has entrusted to the [NLRB]."
Id. at 9.
179. For a discussion of Congress' concern for uniformity in labor regulation, see id. at 9-11.
For a discussion of the concern for uniformity in the enactment of the CPSA, see notes 58 &
64-67 and accompanying text supra.
180. Compare the text of § 10(a) of the NLRA, note 177 supra, with the text of § 26 of the
CPSA, note 70 supra.
181. For a discussion of the NLRB's decision not to exercise its jurisdiction over small scale
businesses, see 353 U.S. at 3-4; note 173 supra. For a discussion of the CPSC's inactivity in the
consumer product safety area during its early years of existence, see notes 8, 20 & 78-81 and
accompanying text supra.
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Upon closer analysis, however, the analogy between the provi-
sion of the NLRA interpreted in Guss and section 26 of the CPSA is
weak. Guss can be fully understood only in light of the Supreme
Court's view of labor relations as a field specially given over by Con-
gress to centralized federal control.1 8 2  The Court has repeatedly
recognized the special need for a single regulatory authority in labor
relations to allow for "delicately structuring the balance of power
among competing forces." 183 Nor is labor relations the only area
where Congress has been interpreted as having occupied an entire
field, for the Court has also held that Congress occupied the field in
the registration and regulation of aliens.' s4 Here again, however, a
strong federal policy, arguably more compelling than the protection of
businesses from overlapping regulation, supported the Court's deci-
sion: the prevention of friction between the United States and foreign
governments which might be caused by state and local governments
imposing discriminatory burdens on aliens.' 8 5
The need for exclusive federal regulation is inherently less com-
pelling in consumer product safety than in other fields held subject to
but one federal master. Unlike the regulation of aliens, with its strong
ties to foreign affairs generally, 186 consumer product safety has no
roots in historically or constitutionally defined federal interests.
Rather, consumer product safety regulation by states will be directed
at protecting the public health and safety, an interest squarely within
182. See note 183 infra.
183. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
286 (1971). See also Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1964); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776,
346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953). Commentators have generally cited the labor relations field as one
where federal policy requires a single national policy with the federal government as the "one
master" because of such overriding federal interest. See, e.g., 1. BARRON & C. DIENES,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 288 (1975); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 387 (1978); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337, 1337-
39 (1972).
184. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1941). Hines involved a challenge to the
Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1801-1806 (Purdon 1977), which
required aliens residing within Pennsylvania to register annually with the state, id. 9 1801, and
which provided for fines of up to $100 or imprisonment for up to 60 days or both for violating
the act. Id. § 1805. See also 312 U.S. at 59-60. After the Pennsylvania Act was passed, Congress
enacted the Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, §§ 1-41, 54 Stat. 670 (current version at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1306 (1976)). See 312 U.S. at 60-61. The Court interpreted the Federal Act to
provide "a standard for alien registration in a single integrated and all-embracing system in
order to obtain the information deemed to be desirable in connection with aliens," while pro-
tecting "the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registration
system." Id. at 74. The Court therefore held that the Pennsylvania Act was unenforceable under
the supremacy clause. Id.
185. 312 U.S. at 64-68.
186. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1941). For a discussion of Hines, see note
184 supra.
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the traditional exercise of the state police power.' 8 7 Thus, the argu-
ment that the enactment of the CPSA implicitly preempts all state
regulation of consumer product safety is not persuasive.
The argument for implicit preemption by the CPSA is further
weakened when the language of section 26 is read with its legislative
history.' 8 Unlike the section of the NLRA at issue in the Guss
case, 189 section 26 is not structured as a provision for pervasive
preemption qualified by a provision permitting exemption by the fed-
eral agency. Instead, the preemptive language of the CPSA is limited
by its terms only to product risks already subject to a CPSC stan-
dard. 190 This limitation has been explicitly recognized by the CPSC
itself in its interim regulations under the identically worded preemp-
tive provisions of the Flammable Fabrics Act and the Poison Preven-
tion Packaging Act. 19' Thus, the most reasonable interpretation of
Congress' objective in enacting the CPSA preemption provision is
simply that manufacturers should not be subjected to both federal
and state regulations of the same product risks, and not that Congress
sought to place all regulation of consumer product safety under the
jurisdiction of the CPSC.
2. Limitations Imposed by the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution
The state power to regulate consumer product safety in a manner
which would affect interstate commerce is limited not only by con-
gressional action in areas constitutionally delegated to the federal
government, but also by the Constitution itself.' 92 As early as 1824,
187. See note 8 and accompanying text supra; notes 208-30 and accompanying text infra.
188. For a discussion of the text and the legislative history of § 26, see notes 59-77 and
accompanying text supra.
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). For a discussion of Guss, see notes 173-82 and accom-
panying text supra.
190. See note 77 and accompanying text supra. For the text of § 26 of the CPSA, see note 70
supra. The House Report on the 1976 amendments confirms that Congress intended that fed-
eral law should preempt only where the CPSC had exercised its regulatory authority. See notes
71-72 and accompanying text supra.
191. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
192. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-54 (1977)
(holding invalid a North Carolina law prohibiting out-of-state apple producers from marketing
their apples under the foreign state's grading system); Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell,
424 U.S. 366, 370, 381 (1976) (holding invalid a state law prohibiting sale within the state of
milk produced in another state unless the other state signed a reciprocity agreement); Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252-54, 259 (1946) (holding invalid a state tax on the interstate sales of
securities having legal situs within the state). In Freeman, for example, the Court stated that
"the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon
the power of the States." Id. at 252 (citations omitted).
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the Supreme Court acknowledged in dictum the strength of the ar-
gument that the constitutional grant to the federal government of au-
thority over interstate commerce implied that such authority was ex-
elusive, prohibiting the states from regulating commerce at all, regard-
less of whether Congress had actually enacted any corresponding
legislation. 193 It was a full quarter-century later, however, in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 194 that the Court first squarely addressed the
question whether all state power to regulate commerce had been ab-
rogated by the constitutional grant of the commerce power to the
federal government. 195
In Cooley, the Court reviewed a Pennsylvania statutory require-
ment that all ships entering and leaving the Port of Philadelphia en-
gage a local pilot. 196 Although the Court expressly acknowledged
that this requirement was state regulation of interstate commerce, 197
the Court held the pilotage requirement valid, 198 basing its decision
193. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (dictum). In Gibbons, the
Court stated:
It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as the word "to regu-
late" implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessar-
ily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing.
That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as
they were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as
much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power designs to leave
untouched, as that on which it has operated. There is great force in this argument, and
the court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.
Id. (dictum). For further discussion of Gibbons, see note 5 supra.
194. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
195. See id. Between 1824, when Gibbons was decided, and 1851, when Cooley was decided,
the Supreme Court had avoided articulating the limit* of state power to enforce regulations
which affect interstate commerce by classifying the challenged state action as either an invalid
state interference with interstate commerce, see, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
419, 445-49 (1827) (holding invalid a state law prohibiting the sale of imported goods without a
license) (alternative holding), or as a valid exercise of constitutionally reserved police powers of
the states free of any actual conflict with federal legislation. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (upholding a state statute authorizing the
construction of a dam over a navigable stream); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
102, 139 (1837) (upholding the validity of a state statute requiring ship masters to report the
names of all persons coming into New York on board their ships). This conclusionary classifica-
tion system, while reflected in the tendency of the more recent decisions to inquire into the
nature of the goal allegedly served by challenged state action, really served to obscure the logic
by which the Court distinguished between valid and invalid state regulation affecting interstate
commerce. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-3, at 321-24 (1978).
196. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 311-12.
197. Id. at 316. The Court stated as follows:
That the power to regulate commerce includes the regulation of navigation, we con-
sider settled. And when we look to the nature of the service, performed by pilots . . . we
are brought to the conclusion, that the regulation[s] [imposed upon pilots] . . . do consti-
tute regulations of navigation, and consequently of commerce, within the just meaning of
this clause of the Constitution.
Id. at 315-16.
198. Id. at 321.
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on a distinction between types of commercial subjects "quite unlike
in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule,
operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every
port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively de-
manding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of
navigation." 199 After noting that regulation of pilots in local ports
had been traditionally controlled by local governments,2 0 0 that such
regulation had been recognized by Congress as a subject appropriate
for state regulation, 201 and that piloting in general required the ben-
efits of local knowledge and experience,202 the Court concluded that
the regulation of pilots in local ports was not a commercial subject
given over exclusively to the federal government by the commerce
clause. 203
The Cooley decision established a middle course between the
more extreme interpretations of the commerce clause which had pre-
viously been suggested by some members of the Court.20 4 Cooley
held that the constitutional grant of the commerce power prohibits
some state regulation of commerce on its own force and without con-
gressional action, but leaves other state regulation unaffected. 20 5 The
Cooley opinion suggests dividing permissible from impermissible state
regulation by characterizing the subject of regulation as either a
"local" or a "national" concern.2 0 6  But the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the years following Cooley moved away from this simple
dichotomy toward a more forthright examination of the nature and
degree of the effect which the challenged state action would have on
interstate commerce. 20 7
199. Id. at 319.
200. Id. at 312.
201. Id. at 317-18, 319-20. This act permitted the states to regulate local pilots. See 53 U.S.
(12 How.) at 317, 319-20.
202. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 320.
203. Id. at 321.
204. On the one extreme was the position that the power to regulate commerce had been
vested in Congress to the exclusion of the states, as was suggested in Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824), quoted at note
193 supra. An even more direct statement of this interpretation can be found in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Story in Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 153-61 (1837)
(Story, J., dissenting).
At the opposite extreme was the view that state regulation of commerce should be consid-
ered valid unless it actually conflicts with a law of Congress, as was suggested in the separate
opinion of Chief Justice Taney in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578-80 (1847)
(separate opinion of Taney, C.J.). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 195, § 6-3, at 322.
205. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
206. See id. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 195, § 6-4, at 324-25.
207. This development began with decisions such as Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois,
118 U.S. 557 (1886), in which the Court held that a state law was invalid if it imposed a
"direct," as opposed to an "indirect," burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 567. In Wabash,
after analyzing the "degree of interference," the Court held invalid a state law regulating the
[VOL. 25: p. 232
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Although modern cases have continued to scrutinize both the
ends and means of challenged state regulation, and also the effect of
such regulation on interstate commerce, the emphasis as between
these two concerns varies depending on the specific context. Thus, in
South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers,208
the Court upheld the constitutionality of South Carolina's regulation
of the size and weight of trucks using state highways.20 9 Stressing
the legitimacy of South Carolina's concerns for the safe and economi-
cal administration of state highways, the Court limited its inquiry to a
determination of "whether the state ... ha[d] acted within its pro-
vince, and whether the means of regulation chosen [were] reasonably
adapted to the end sought." 2 10 The Court dismissed the controversy
over whether axle or wheel weight limitations or gross weight limita-
tions were better to achieve the state's goal of highway preservation
and safety, holding that it was sufficient that the measure chosen,
gross weight limits, was at least rationally related to the legitimate
state goal. 211 The Court found that the choice between different
regulatory means, all rationally serving a proper state goal, was for
the legislature, not the Court. 212 Although most of the opinion fo-
cused on the relationship between the means and the end of the state
rates charged by railroads carrying goods through the state to other states. Id. at 575-77. Coin-
pare Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584, 585 (1900) (upholding an ordinance limiting the speed of
railroad trains within city limits) and Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888) (stating in
dictum that matters including "the rate of speed at stations and through villages, towns, and
cities" are within the limits of local law) with Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310,
316 (1917) (holding invalid a state law limiting the speed of railroad trains at each crossing so
that the train could stop in time should any person or thing cross the track). The phrasing of
such analyses was criticized as conclusionary and deceptively precise. See, e.g., Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). See also, L. TRIBE, supra note 195,
§§ 6-4 to -5, at 325-26. The test was ultimately replaced by a more openly indeterminate balanc-
ing test. See notes 208-25 and accompanying text infra.
208. 303 U.S. 117 (1938).
209. Id. at 195-96. The state law prohibited the use on state highways of trucks whose width
exceeded 90 inches, and whose weight, including load, exceeded 20,000 pounds. Id. at 180.
Truckers and interstate shippers contended, inter alia, that the law imposed an unconstitutional
burden on commerce by arguing as folows: 1) limits on truck weight were more appropriately
stated in terms of weight per axle or per wheel; 2) most other states had adopted per axle or per
wheel limits which permitted use of their highways by trucks heavier than those permitted in
South Carolina; and therefore, 3) a large number of interstate shippers and truckers permitted
to travel in neighboring states would he foreclosed from using South Carolina highways. Id. at
182-84. A similar argument was made to challenge the limitation on truck width. Id.
The Court, however, reviewed at length testimony considered by the South Carolina legis-
lature before enacting its law, and concluded that the legislature's choice, though questionable,
was rationally related to the state's purpose of preserving the highways and promoting highway
safety. Id. at 192-96.
210. Id. at 190.
211. Id. at 195-96.
212. Id. at 191-92.
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regulation, the Court also emphasized that the state law did not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce. 213
Seven years later, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sul-
livan,2 14 the Court expanded the Barnwell analysis into an explicit
balancing test.2 15 In Southern Pacific the State had enacted a law
limiting the number of passenger or freight cars on trains within the
state in order to reduce injuries from the "slack action" of long
trains.2 16  The Arizona Supreme Court had upheld the state law in
terms reminiscent of Barnwell-i.e., since the statute was enacted
under the State police power to promote health and safety, to which the
limit was at least rationally related, it was valid despite its effects on
interstate commerce.2 17  On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Arizona decision, holding that the state law was
an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 218 The Court did
not limit its inquiry to a determination of whether the statute was
enacted under the state's police power to promote health and safety
and whether it was rationally related to that end.2 19 Instead, the
Supreme Court maintained that the statute's validity would depend
upon
whether . . . the total effect of the law as a safety measure in re-
ducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not
to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce
free from interferences which seriously impede it and subject it to
local regulation which does not have a uniform effect on the in-
terstate train journey which it interrupts.2 20
213. Id. at 185-86, 189.
214. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
215. See text accompanying note 220 infra.
216. 325 U.S. at 763. In Southern Pacific, the State of Arizona brought suit against a railroad
company to recover penalties imposed for violation of a state law which limited the length of
trains operating within the state to 14 passenger cars or 70 freight cars. Id. The state argued
that the law was a valid exercise of its police power because it was designed to alleviate the
danger of accident due to "slack action" (i.e., the amount of free movement of one car befbre it
transmits its motion to an adjoining coupled car). Id. at 764, 776. Although little of the evidence
offered in support of the state's argument is mentioned in the opinion of the Court, Justice
Black briefly reviewed in his dissent some of the findings which may have influenced the state
legislature. See id. at 786 (Black, J., dissenting).
217. State ex rel. Conway v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Ariz. 66, 82, 145 P.2d 530, 536 (1943),
rev'd sub nora. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
218. 325 U.S. at 764.
219. For a discussion of Barnwell, see notes 208-13 and accompanying text supra.
220. 325 U.S. at 775-76.
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Because the Court perceived the train limit law to impose a "serious
burden" on interstate commerce, requiring radical shortening of all
trains passing through the state, or reconstitution of longer trains at
the state border, its inquiry into the effectiveness of the law as a
safety measure was far more probing and skeptical than its treatment
of the analogous dispute in Barnwell between axle and gross weight
limits. 221
The balancing test of Southern Pacific-weighing the state in-
terests served by the challenged state regulation against the burdens
on interstate commerce imposed by such regulation-has charac-
terized most modern decisions in which state action has been assailed
as inconsistent with the commerce clause of the Constitution. 222  The
formulation of this test most often cited and relied upon by the Court
in its recent decisions 22 3 is that found in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.: 224
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
221. Compare 325 U.S. at 771-79 with 303 U.S. at 151-93. In Southern Pacific, the principal
burden recognized by the Court was that, since most states permit longer trains, railroads
which needed to run through Arizona would have to undergo the costly process of breaking up
longer trains at the Arizona border and remaking the trains after leaving the state or else forego
the use of longer trains altogether. 325 U.S. at 771-75. On the other hand, the Court consid-
ered the safety advantages afforded by the law to be "slight and dubious," and noted the
existence of evidence that more iniuries would be caused by the increased number of trains
than would be avoided by the limit on the number of cars. Id. at 775-79.
222. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); notes 224-25 and accompanying
text infra. See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979) (relying on Pike in in-
validating a state law which prohibited the transporation of minnows captured in state waters for
sale outside of the state); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (relying on Pike
in invalidating a state law which prohibited persons from bringing waste collected outside the
state into the state for dumping); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441-42
(1978) (relying on Pike in invalidating a state law limiting the length of trucks on state high-
ways); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976) (relying o Pike in
invalidating a Mississippi law which prohibited the sale of milk produced in another state unless
that other state reciprocally accepted milk produced in Mississippi).
223. See cases cited note 222 supra.
224. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In Pike, the Court invalidated an Arizona state law requiring all
cantaloupes grown in Arizona, or offered for sale there, to be packed in state-approved contain-
ers designed to insure that the cantaloupes were of high quality and thereby enhance the state's
reputation for fine cantaloupes. Id. at 138, 142-43. Since a California company, which chal-
lenged the law, would therefore be unable to ship the cantaloupes uncrated from Arizona to its
packing facilities in California, the company would have had to build another packing facility in
Arizona at a cost of approximately $200,000. Id. at 140. Although the Court acknowledged that
the state's interest in enhancing the reputation of its farm products was "legitimate," it found
that it did not justify burdening an out-of-state company by requiring it to build a costly packing
plant in Arizona. Id. at 145.
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benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the ques-
tion becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local in-
terest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with
a lesser impact on interstate commerce. 225
Applying this analysis to the area of consumer product safety, it
suggests that if a state attempts to regulate consumer product safety,
the constitutionality of the state regulation would depend upon the
state's ability to show the following: 1) that the regulation is designed
to serve a legitimate state interest; 226 2) that the regulation effec-
tively serves the state interest without discriminating against in-
terstate commerce; 227 3) that any incidental burden imposed upon
225. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). Language in a recent United States Supreme Court opinion
might suggest a return to the notion that legislation is constitutionally permissible if it rationally
serves a legitimate state interest, at least where the legislation is designed to serve the state's
interest in safety. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). In Raymond
Motor, the majority acknowledged "that there is language in Barnwell Bros. 'which read in
isolation from . . . later decisions . . . , would suggest that no showing of burden on interstate
commerce is sufficient to invalidate local safety regulations in the absence of some element of
discrimination against interstate commerce.' " Id. at 443, quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 528-29 (1959). The majority opinion in Raymond Motor, however, rejected
the interpretation which reads Barnwell to say "that inquiry under the Commerce Clause is
ended without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose against the degree of interference with
interstate commerce." 434 U.S. at 443. But the four concurring Justices felt compelled to file a
narrower, separate opinion which strongly emphasized the "illusory nature of the safety in-
terests in this case," rather than the burden thereby imposed on interstate commerce. Id. at
450 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This concurring opinion warns that "if safety justifications are not
illusory, the Court will not second guess legislative judgment about their importance in com-
parison with related burdens on interstate commerce." Id. This language could certainly suggest
that legitimate state safety regulations are to be judged independently of issues relating to
burdens on commerce. Cf. D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE
292-94 (1974) (stating that the balancing test may be in flux).
On the other hand, such language might be best understood, not as a repudiation of the
concept of weighing the burdens on interstate commerce, but rather as a reaction against the
willingness of some courts to undertake clearly legislative functions, such as by resolving con-
flicts in evidence presented to the state legislature. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Engineermen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 136 (1968); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting). Indeed, this language
might be interpreted to indicate that state safety interests weigh very heavily in determining
whether such regulation unduly burdens commerce. See cases cited note 229 infra.
Nonetheless, the Raymond Motor concurrence suggests that some of the Justices may be
leaning towards significantly narrowing the negative implications of the commerce clause. This
possibility may explain the willingness of Congress to attempt explicit resolution of federalism
issues in federal legislation, as in section 26 of the CPSA. Such detailed preemption language is
rare in federal legislation. For another recent example, see the Hazardous Materials Transporta-
tion Act, 490 U.S.C. § 1811 (1976). For a discussion of this act and related legislation, see Frye,
Recent Developments in the Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 10 TRANsP. L.J. 97, 119-20
(1978).
226. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
227. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-38 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 626-29 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 351-54
(1977).
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interstate commerce by the regulation does not outweigh the benefits
of the regulation; 228 and 4) that there are no less burdensome, non-
discriminatory alternatives available. 229
The first element, a legitimate state interest, may be satisfied by
emphasizing that the public health and safety are the goals toward
which state consumer product safety regulation is directed. In com-
merce clause litigation, the Court has shown a special tolerance for
state regulation serving to protect health and safety, not only because
these goals have traditionally been included in the "police powers"
reserved to the states,2 30 but also because any court would hesitate to
find health and safety less important than the financial burdens result-
ing from interference with interstate commerce. 23'
But the mere fact that a state couches its legislative purpose in
terms of health and safety will not necessarily immunize a statute
from challenge under the commerce clause. Where the health or
safety purpose of challenged legislation merely supplements an im-
proper motive, such as economic discrimination against out-of-state
enterprise, the legislation is unconstitutional.2 3 2 Further, if the
228. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444-47 (1978); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1970).
229. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336-38 (1979); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 354 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56
(1951).
230. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960). The
Court's deference to state safety regulations was also emphasized in both the majority and con-
curring opinions in Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). Although the
Court held invalid the state law limiting the length of trucks using state highways, id. at 447-48,
the opinion of the court acknowledged that "it also is true that the Court has been most reluc-
tant to invalidate under the Commerce Clause ' "state legislation in the field of safety where the
propriety of local regulation has long been recognized." '" Id. at 443, quoting Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. at 143, quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S.
at 796 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See note 225 supra.
231. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineermen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R.,
393 U.S. 129, 139-40 (1968). In Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the district court and upheld the constitutionality of a state law specifying
a minimum number of crew members to be carried by a train. Id. at 144. In so doing, the
Court stated that it was improper for
the District Court to place a value on the additional safety [fostered by the challenged
state legislation] in terms of dollars and cents, in order to see whether this value, as
calculated by the court, exceeded the financial cost to the railroads. . . . It is difficult at
best to say that financial losses should be balanced against the loss of lives and limbs of
workers and people using the highways.
Id. at 139-40. See also note 230 supra.
232. See notes 227-229 and accompanying text supra. An early expression of this limitation
is found in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), where the Supreme Court
struck down New York legislation prohibiting sales of milk produced outside New York and
purchased by the retailer at below the minimum price set for similar purchases within New
York. Id. at 519, 527-28. The state had argued that the regulation of milk prices was designed to
assure an "adequate supply of pure and wholesome milk" and, thus, "to make its inhabitants
healthy" not "rich." Id. at 523. Justice Cardozo's opinion expressed the policy supporting the
rule against discriminatory legislation: "The Constitution was framed ... upon the theory that
the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together." Id.
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safety or health goal targeted by the challenged state legislation is
ineffectively promoted by such legislation, this can hardly justify a
material impediment to interstate commerce. 233 Finally, even where
a health or safety goal is the primary purpose of state regulation, and
is effectively served, the measure may be vulnerable to attack on the
ground that a less burdensome approach is possible. 234
Some state regulation of consumer product safety is, therefore,
clearly permitted under the commerce clause of the Federal Con-
stitution, but the validity of a particular state regulation will depend
upon the skill with which it is designed. Any state action in this area
will be most easily defended against constitutional attack if the mea-
sures enacted serve only genuine safety goals, 235 and serve such goals
efficiently. 236  Efficiency can be shown by empirical data establishing
both 1) that a safety hazard arising from use of the regulated product
exists, and 2) that the hazard will be ameliorated by the state's chosen
means of regulation. For example, if a state were to attempt regula-
tion of a product risk by requiring that certain minimum information
be included on the label, the measure would be more easily defended
if the state could demonstrate that the purchasers or consumers of the
product were likely to be literate (not small children) and likely to
consult the label at the time of purchase or consumption. Similarly, if
the state wished to require safety caps for poisonous products, such a
regulation would be supported by evidence that the caps work,
thereby countering anecdotal observations that consumers of safety-
capped products often leave the product uncapped to avoid the in-
convenience of having to struggle to open the container.
In designing a consumer product safety regulation, the state gov-
ernment should investigate the likely impact of the regulation on in-
terstate commerce. 23 7  Costs that manufacturers and distributors will
233. See notes 228 & 229 and accompanying text supra; Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
The Raymond Motor Court repeatedly emphasized the failure of the state to provide evi-
dence showing that the state law served the state's asserted goal. See 434 U.S. at 437-38,
444-45, 447-48. In Southern Pacific, it appears that the safety of trains longer than those permit-
ted by the contested statute was likewise "unchallenged." 325 U.S. at 773. See also Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 525 (1959) (in invalidating an Illinois statute requiring
contour mudguards, the Court noted evidence of the regulation's ineffectiveness). For a discus-
sion of another aspect of Raymond Motor, see note 230 supra. For a discussion of Southern
Pacific, see notes 214-21 and accompanying text supra.
234. See note 229 and accompanying text supra.
235. See notes 226 & 230-31 and accompanying text supra.
236. See notes 228 & 233 and accompanying text supra.
237. See notes 225 & 228 and accompanying text supra.
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have to bear as a result of the regulation should be thoroughly
evaluated with an eye toward minimizing such burdens, if possible,
while still providing the protection sought. Other states' actual or
proposed regulations of the same products should also be surveyed,
since a burden which is otherwise reasonable could be judged intol-
erable if a nationally distributed product would encounter mutually
inconsistent regulations in several states. 23
8
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the extensive preemptive language of section 26 of the
Consumer Product Safety Act, 239 there is still a broad area of regula-
tory action open to state governments. The explicit limitations of sec-
tion 26 of the CPSA make it inapplicable to state regulation of prod-
uct risks not yet the subject of CPSC safety standards. 240 As to
such product risks, state safety standards will most likely be upheld as
consistent with the federal legislation and valid under the commerce
clause of the Constitution if the regulation has been properly de-
signed to -affect only legitimate health or safety risks, 241 to ameliorate
those risks efficiently, 242 and to burden commerce as little as possible
while achieving the targeted health and safety goals. 243 State laws
banning a product altogether are unaffected by the federal legisla-
tion. 244
Such regulation not only requires careful investigation and
analysis, but probably also necessitates documentation of the care
with which the adopted regulatory design was chosen. 245 Where ex-
tensive research data are unavailable, state officials should at least be
prepared to provide some coherent reasoning to support the mode of
regulation adopted. In theory, this approach involves little more than
sound legislative or administrative methods. In practice, however,
some state officials may be hesitant or unable to build elaborate foun-
dations for their regulatory decisions. Whether less carefully con-
ceived state regulation stems from inadequate staffing or funding of
238. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526-28, 529-30 (1959) (Il-
linois law required trucks to use contour mudguards; other states required conventional mud-
guards; law held invalid because of the burden on commerce imposed by the conflicting re-
quirements).
239. For the text of § 26 of the CPSA, see note 70 supra.
240. See notes 188-91 and accompanying text supra.
241. See notes 227 & 230-31 and accompanying text supra.
242. See notes 229 & 232-33 and accompanying text supra.
243. See notes 228-29 & 234 and accompanying text supra.
244. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
245. See notes 235-38 and accompanying text supra.
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state government, from pro- or anti-business biases on the part of
state officials, or from other sources, regulation not founded upon
careful research and analysis may be vulnerable to attack under the
commerce clause of the Constitution. 246
Once the CPSC promulgates a safety standard regarding any
product risk, however, state regulatory authority becomes subject to
the detailed limitations of section 26.247 An activist Commission
could thus narrow the realm of permissible state regulation in this
field. Nevertheless, with so many potential targets for regulation,
even a highly activist Commission could not develop safety standards
for a majority of the product risks addressable under the CPSA with-
out years of additional investigation and analysis. Furthermore, if and
when the Commission seeks to regulate product risks not previously
regulated by the federal government, states can participate in the de-
velopment of the new federal standards.2 48  This statutorily
sanctioned participation will, of course, be most persuasive where of-
fered by a state government with a history of effective regulation.
246. See notes 192-238 and accompanying text supra.
247. See notes 82-91 and accompanying text supra.
248. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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